With a flawed diagnosis of the causes of the crisis, it is hardly surprising that many policymakers have failed to understand its progression. Today’s failure of confidence is based on three related issues: the solvency of banks, their ability to fund themselves in illiquid markets and the health of the real economy. The bursting of the housing bubble has led to hefty credit losses: most Western financial institutions are short of capital and some are insolvent. But liquidity is a more urgent problem. America’s decision last month to let Lehman Brothers fail—and the losses that implied to money-market funds that held its debt—prompted a global run on wholesale credit markets. It has become hard for banks, even healthy ones, to find finance; large companies with healthy cash flows have also been cut off from all but the shortest-term financing. That has increased worries about the real economy, which itself adds to the worries about banks’ solvency.
鉴于对这场危机症结的诊断有误,许多决策者未能把握其进展也就不足为奇了。今天的信心崩溃建立在三个相互关联的问题上:银行的偿付能力,银行在流动性冻结的市场上融资的能力,实体经济是否健康。房地产市场泡沫的破裂造成严重的信贷损失:大多数西方国家金融机构资金短缺,部分已经破产。但流动性的问题更急迫。美国上个月让雷曼兄弟破产加速了全球大规模信贷市场的流动性问题,其破产造成的损失牵连到持有其债券的货币市场基金。银行融资难度越来越大,即使是健康的银行。现金流良好的大型企业也得不到贷款,只能获得最短期的融资。对实体经济的担忧由此增加,反过来又进一步增加了对银行偿付能力的担忧。
This analysis suggests that governments must attack all three concerns at once. The priority, in terms of stemming the panic, is to unblock clogged credit markets. In most cases that means using central banks as an alternative source of short-term cash. This week the Fed took another step in that direction: by buying commercial paper, it is now in effect lending direct to companies. The British approach is equally bold. Alongside the Bank of England’s provision of short-term cash, the Treasury says it will sell guarantees for as much as £250 billion ($430 billion) of new short-term and medium-term debts issued by the banks. That is risky: if left for any length of time, those pledges give banks an incentive to behave recklessly. But a temporary guarantee system offers the best chance of stemming the panic, and if it were internationally co-ordinated it would be both more credible and less risky than a collection of disparate national promises.
基于上述分析,政府应该立刻对这三个问题全面出击。首先,在阻止恐慌方面,是为堵塞的信贷市场清除障碍。在大多数情况下,这意味着将中央银行作为一个能够 提供短期资金的来源。本周美联储朝着这个方向又迈进了一步:通过购买商业票据,美联储现在可以直接向企业提供有效的贷款。英国的举措也是同样大胆。除英格兰银行(英国央行)提供短期资金外,财政部还表示将为银行发行的新短期和中期债券提供2500亿英镑(4300亿美元)的担保。这种做法存在风险:如果没有限定期限,这些保证会给银行不顾风险地经营提供动机(道德风险)。但暂时的担保系统是阻止恐慌的最佳选择,如果是全球一致行动,则比大量国家各自的承诺更加可靠、风险更低。
The second prong of a crisis-resolution strategy must aim to boost banks’ capital. A new IMF report suggests Western banks need some $675 billion of new equity to prevent banks from rapidly reducing the number of loans on their books and hurting the real economy. Although there is plenty of private capital sloshing around, there is a chicken-and-egg problem: nobody wants to buy equity in an industry without enough capital. It is becoming abundantly clear that government funds—or at least government intervention—will be necessary to catalyse the rebuilding of banks’ balance sheets. Initially, America focused more on buying tainted assets from banks; now it seems keener on the “European” approach of injecting capital into their banks. Some degree of divergence is inevitable, but more co-ordination is needed.
解决危机战略的第二击是增加银行资本金。IMF的一份最新报告指出,西方国家银行需要大约6750亿美元的新增资本,以阻止其账面上贷款数量快速减少,避免损害到实体经济。尽管还有大量的私人资本四处流窜,但这是一个鸡生蛋蛋生鸡的问题:没有人愿意在一个缺乏足够资本的行业里购买股权。很显然,政府必须注资——或至少是政府干预,加速重建银行的资产负债表。最初,美国更多地集中在从银行购买问题资产,现在更青睐“欧洲”作法——向银行注入资本。一些分歧不可避免,但还需要更多的协调。
Third, policymakers should act together to cushion the economic fallout. Now that commodity prices have plunged, the inflation risk has dramatically receded across the rich world. With asset prices plummeting and economies shrinking, deflation will soon be a bigger worry. The interest-rate cuts are an important start. Ideally, policymakers would not use only monetary policy. For instance, China could do a lot to help the rest of the world economy (and itself) by loosening fiscal policy and allowing its currency to appreciate more quickly.
第三,决策者应该联合行动帮助经济软着陆。如今,大宗商品价格跳水,通货膨胀的风险已经戏剧化地从发达国家消退了。随着资产价格垂直下落和经济收缩,通缩将很快成为更大的担忧。各国纷纷降息是一个重要的开端。理想状态下,决策者不应该仅仅使用货币政策。举例而言,中国可以通过放松财政政策和加速人民币升值来帮助其他国家经济(和中国自身)。