In China, however, even this would understate the true stimulus, because some public-infrastructure investment will be done by state-owned firms or local governments and financed by banks. Tao Wang of UBS estimates that new infrastructure investment, tax cuts, consumer subsidies and increased spending on health care will amount to a stimulus by the central government of about 3% of GDP in 2009. Adding in bank-financed infrastructure spending might lift the total to 4% of GDP.
然而在中国,经济赤字掩盖了真实的刺激方案,因为一些公共基础设施投资是由银行提供资金、国有公司或地方政府实施的。瑞银的陶旺(音)预计,新的基础设施建设、减税、消费补贴以及医疗方面的投资增长将构成总额占到GDP3%的09年中央政府刺激方案。如果加上由银行提供资金支持的基建支出,整个刺激方案将占到GDP的4%。
Chinese investment in railways, roads and power grids is already booming. In the first two months of this year, total fixed investment was 30% higher in real terms than a year earlier, and investment in railways tripled. China has been much criticised for focusing its stimulus on investment, rather than consumption, but in China in the short term this is the quickest way to boost domestic demand.
中国在铁路、公路和电网方面的投资已经大规模展开。今年头两个月内,固定投资总额较去年同期增长30%,铁路投资增长了3倍。很多批评认为,中国的刺激方案集中于投资而不是消费,但就短期来看,在中国这是提高国内需求最立竿见影的方式。
What about the other tool for boosting domestic spending, namely monetary policy? Since the start of last year, China has cut its interest rates by only half as much as America’s Federal Reserve has. New figures showing that consumer prices fell by 1.6% in the year to February have brought the first whiff of deflation, suggesting that China has not done enough to boost demand. But this is not true deflation, where falling prices are accompanied by shrinking money supply and credit. Bank lending grew by 24% over the past year. The true gauge of monetary easing is not the cut in interest rates, but whether it succeeds in spurring new lending. China is one of the few countries in the world where credit has accelerated since the start of the global credit crunch—though some of the lending is of the state-directed sort.
那么作为提高国内消费另一手段的货币政策又运用的怎样?从去年年初开始,中国已经将利率砍到美联储的一半。新的统计数字显示,到二月,消费品价格较去年下降了1.6%,从而带来了第一轮通货紧缩。这似乎意味着中国在提高需求方面做的尚且不够。但其实,这并不是真正的通货紧缩。真正的通缩情况下,货币供应和信贷会随着物价下降而萎缩。去年,银行借贷增长了24%。对银根放松的正确估量并非基于利率,而是其是否成功刺激新的借贷产生。中国作为世界上少有的几个国家,其借贷规模在全球信贷危机爆发后不降反升——尽管部分借贷是在国家指导下进行的。